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Supreme Court Watch
Recent Decisions of Selected Criminal Cases
by diAnA tAFur
Beard v. Kindler
08-992
decided: December 2009
question Presented:
For the purposes of federal habeas relief, can the
adequacy of a state procedural rule hinge upon whether
the rule is discretionary rather than mandatory?

Bobby v. Van Hook
558 U.S. ___ (2009)

Facts:
Joesph Kindler was convicted of first degree
murder in a Pennsylvania state court and sentenced to
death. Kindler appealed his sentence, but then escaped
from prison before the judge could rule on the appeal.
Kindler was captured in Quebec, but shortly thereafter,
he escaped a second time and was recaptured. Five
years later, Kindler sought reinstatement of his post-verdict appeal, but the court denied the appeal, holding that
Kindler had waived his right to appeal his conviction
because he fled prison. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court affirmed the ruling. In 1999, Kindler filed and was
denied a habeas petition in federal district court. On appeal, the Third Circuit found that Pennsylvania’s fugitive-forfeiture rule, which allowed for judicial
discretion, was inadequate to bar federal review. Pennsylvania appealed to the Supreme Court.

decided: November 2009
question Presented:
For purposes of Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984), should defense counsel’s performance
be reviewed under professional standards that existed at
the time of trial, as the majority of circuits require, or
the under the current professional standards?
Facts:

Robert van Hook was convicted of aggravated
murder with one capital specification and aggravated
robbery. van Hook picked up David Self at a bar and
the two went to Self’s apartment where van Hook lured
Self into a vulnerable position, strangled him until he
was unconscious, and then killed him with a kitchen
knife.
decision:
At the sentencing hearing, the defense called
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court eight mitigation witnesses, and van Hook himself gave
held that “a discretionary state procedural rule can serve an unsworn statement. Defense counsel prepared the
as an adequate ground to bar federal habeas review. witnesses before the indictment, trial, and sentencing.
Nothing inherent in such a rule renders it inadequate for The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted
purposes of the adequate state ground doctrine.” The van Hook relief, holding that van Hook’s attorneys perCourt noted that this decision should not provide broad formed deficiently in investigating and presenting mitigating evidence at his sentencing.
guidance on the “adequate state ground doctrine,” not
ing that “[i]f our holding in this case is narrow, it is be- decision:
cause the question we granted certiorari to decide is narThe Supreme Court held that the defense attorrow.”
ney acted reasonably. Citing the holding from Strickland, that representation must not fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness in light of prevailCriminal Law Brief
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ing professional norms, the Court concluded that the
Sixth Circuit erred in relying on ABA guidelines established 18 years after van Hook’s trial. The Court stated
that the Constitution has never required that defense
counsel fully comply with statutory mandates. Although
states are free to impose rules to ensure appropriate representation, the Court held that such rules should be regarded as evidence of what a reasonable diligent lawyer
should do, rather than what a reasonable lawyer is required to do. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the
attorney’s investigation was reasonable and van Hook
was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel.

18 U.S.C. § 3501 abrogated the McNabb-Mallory doctrine, which makes confessions inadmissible if they are
obtained during an unreasonably long period of detention between the arrest and preliminary hearing. The
Third Circuit ruled that under § 3501, confessions are
admissible and voluntary after considering the points
listed in § 3501(b), even if the presentment delay was
unreasonable.

decision:
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded the Third Circuit’s decision and held that
§ 3501 only limits McNabb-Mallory rather than total abCorley v. United States
rogation. The Court ruled that the McNabb-Mallory
doctrine still makes voluntary confessions inadmissible
when they are given after an unreasonable delay. The
556 U.S. ___ (2009)
Court clarified that § 3501(a) can only be interpreted
to mean that all voluntary confessions are admissible as
decided: April 2009
evidence, except when the confession is made after an
unreasonable delay in presenting the defendant to the
question Presented:
Does federal law permit the suppression of a magistrate. In so ruling, the Court relied upon §
voluntary confession made more than six hours after ar- 3501(c), which prevents a confession from being “inadrest but before presentment to a magistrate, as a conse- missible solely because of delay” when the confession
is (1) voluntary and (2) made within six hours of arrest.
quence of unreasonable delay in presentment?
The Court stated that holding otherwise would make
subsection (c) superfluous.
Facts:
Johnnie Corley was suspected of robbing a bank
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts,
in Norristown, Pennsylvania. Federal agents went to arrest Corley and found him attempting to escape in his Jr., Justices Scalia, and Thomas dissented, arguing that
car. Corley nearly ran-over one officer and pushed the language found in § 3501(a) unambiguously makes
down another. At 8:00 a.m., the agents arrested Corley confessions admissible if they are voluntarily given.
for assaulting federal officers.
Federal agents kept Corley at a local police staDistrict Attorney’s Office for the Third
tion while they questioned witnesses. At 11:45 a.m., the
District v. Osborne
agents took Corley to the hospital to treat minor cuts he
sustained during the arrest. Agents then took Corley to
the Philadelphia FBI office at 3:30 p.m. and held him 557 U.S. ___ (2009)
there until 6:30 p.m. The federal agents then asked Corley to put an alleged oral confession in writing. How- decided: June 2009
ever, Corley told the agents he felt tired, so the agents
held him overnight. The interrogation resumed at 10:30 question Presented:
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or under the Fourteenth
a.m. the next morning, concluding with Corley signing
a written confession. At 1:30 p.m., 29.5 hours after his Amendment’s Due Process Clause, is a defendant entiarrest, police presented Corley to a magistrate who tled access to a state’s biological evidence following
charged him with armed robbery and several other re- conviction?
lated charges. Corley moved to suppress the confession.
The District Court denied his motion to suppress Facts:
In March 1994, William Osborne was convicted
under Rule 5(a), finding no unreasonable delay since
Corley asked for a break and had to be taken to the hos- of kidnapping, assault, and sexual assault for forcing
pital. The Third Circuit affirmed the ruling, holding that the victim to perform several sex acts, choking her, beat114
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ing her with his gun and handle of a wooden axe, and
shooting her in the head. After his conviction, Osborne
requested the DNA evidence the state used against him.
Osborne wanted to use new DNA testing technology to
show that he was not the source The state denied Osborne’s request, and upon denial, Osborne filed suit pursuant to § 1983 claiming the District Attorney’s Office
violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process
by refusing to provide potentially exculpatory evidence.
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the
district court’s denial of Osborne’s motion.
decision:
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that
access to such DNA evidence, after Osborne was convicted in a fair trial, is not a constitutional right, but
rather an issue for the states and the federal government
to legislate. The Court pronounced that the appropriate
test is the Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) test,
which asks whether the state’s post-conviction procedures for relief offend a principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental, or transgresses any recognized
principle of fundamental fairness in operation.
Applying Brady, the Court found the state’s
post-conviction relief procedures to be adequate. The
state allows individuals the right to be released when the
evidence is sufficiently compelling in establishing innocence and allows for discovery in post-conviction proceedings, including access to DNA. There was ample
evidence, aside from the DNA evidence, that Osborne
committed the crime.
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion joined by
Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Souter
joined in part, arguing that the Court’s prior decisions
and implementation of DNA access laws across the
country make judicial intervention more, not less, appropriate.

Flores-Figueroa v. United States
556 U.S. ___ (2009)
decided: May 2009
question Presented:
Can an individual, who used false identification
in the commission of a crime but was unaware that it
belonged to another person, be convicted of “aggravated
Criminal Law Brief

identity theft” under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)?
Facts:
In 2000, Ignacio Flores-Figueroa secured employment using a false name, birth date, Social Security
number, and a counterfeit alien registration card. Flores-Figueroa is a citizen of Mexico. In 2006, FloresFigueroa provided his employer with more counterfeit
documents that used his real name, but he was unaware
that the documentation was legally registered to other
people. The government charged Flores with entering
the United States without inspection, misusing immigration documents, and aggravated identity theft. Flores-Figueroa was convicted on two counts of aggravated
identity theft in a federal district court and sentenced to
75 months imprisonment.
Flores-Figueroa appealed the conviction, contending that the aggravated identify theft offense required he
have knowledge that the identification belonged to another individual. The Eighth Circuit rejected the argument and affirmed the trial court’s decision.
decision:
The Supreme Court concluded that §
1028A(a)(1) requires the government to prove that the
defendant knew that the means of identification he unlawfully transferred, possessed, or used, belonged to a
real person. Applying the rules of statutory construction, the Court explained that phrases in a criminal
statute that introduce the elements of a crime with the
word “knowingly,” must be read as applying “knowingly” to each element. In this case, because FloresFigueroa did not know the information belonged to
another, the government did not meet its burden of
showing that Flores-Figueroa knowingly violated the
statute. The Court reversed and remanded.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote
a separate concurring opinion, expressing that a mens
rea or “knowingly” requirement should not ordinarily
be read into criminal statutes, especially when the statute
is carefully constructed to limit or eliminate a mens rea
requirement.
Justice Alito also wrote a separate concurrence,
noting that he was concerned that the Court’s ruling
would be read as applying an overly-rigid rule of statutory construction.

Knowles v. Mirzayance
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556 U.S. ___ (2009)
decided: March 2009
question Presented:
Does a defense counsel’s recommendation to
abandon an insanity defense constitute ineffective assistance of counsel for the purpose of federal habeas law?
Facts:
Alex Mirzayance confessed to murdering his 19year-old cousin by stabbing her nine times with a hunting knife and then shooting her four times. At trial, he
entered two pleas, one of not guilty and another of not
guilty by reason of insanity (NGI). Under California
law, when these two pleas are entered, the court must
hold a bifurcated trial, guilt determined during the first
phase and the viability of the defendant’s NGI plea during the second. Mirzayance sought to avoid a first-degree murder conviction during the guilt phase of
Mirzayance’s trial and presented medical testimony that
he was insane at the time of the crime. The jury still
convicted Mirzayance of first-degree murder. On the
advice of his counsel, Mirzayance abandoned his NGI
plea because he would have borne the burden of proving
his insanity to the same jury that had just convicted him
of first-degree murder. After the court sentenced Mirzayance, he challenged the conviction, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
The California trial court denied the petition and
the California Court of Appeal affirmed. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that
the state court had unreasonably applied clearly established case law that defense counsel’s failure to pursue
the insanity defense constituted deficient performance.
decision:
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit judgment and remanded the
case with instructions to deny the petition, ruling that
the California’s decision to deny Mirzayance’s claim did
not violate clearly established federal law.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a federal court may
not grant a state prisoner’s habeas application unless the
relevant state-court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States.” In its ruling, the Court rejected
116

the Ninth Circuit analysis that Mirzayance had “nothing
to lose” in pursuing his NGI defense and concluded that
federal law never established such a standard. Instead,
the Court ruled that habeas relief may only be granted
if the state court decision unreasonably applied the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel standard established by
Strickland, which holds that a defendant must show deficient performance and prejudice.
The Court found that Mirzayance’s ineffectiveassistance claim failed because it was reasonable for the
state court to conclude Mirzayance’s defense counsel’s
performance was not deficient. When Mirzayance’s attorney advised him to abandon the NGI claim, the attorney did so because he believed his client stood almost
no chance of success. The Court noted that it has never
required defense counsel to pursue every claim or defense, regardless of its merit, viability, or realistic
chance for success. Accordingly, the Court found
Mirzayance’s attorney did not violate the Strickland
standard.

Montejo v. Louisiana
556 U.S. ___ (2009)
decided: May 2009
question Presented:
Must an indigent defendant affirmatively accept
the appointment of counsel in order to preclude future
police interrogation without an attorney present?
Facts:
Jesse Montejo was charged with first-degree
murder and the court ordered that an attorney be appointed for Montejo. Later that day, the police advised
Montejo of his Miranda rights and asked Montejo to accompany them in locating the murder weapon. Montejo
agreed. Neither Montejo, nor the police officers, were
aware that Montejo had been appointed an attorney.
During the search for the weapon, at the suggestion of
one of the detectives, Montejo wrote an inculpatory letter of apology to the victim’s widow. Upon returning
to the police station, Montejo finally met his court-appointed attorney. At trial, his letter was admitted over
defense objection, and he was convicted and sentenced
to death.
The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that,
although Montejo had been appointed counsel at the
Winter 2009

preliminary hearing, Montejo had not affirmatively requested counsel or invoked any of his Miranda rights,
and, therefore, the letter was admissible.
decision:
In a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court overruled
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), a case holding that law enforcement must refrain from interrogating
suspects once they have invoked their right to counsel
at a preliminary hearing. The Court found Jackson unworkable because, in some jurisdictions, counsel is automatically appointed to indigent suspects, while other
jurisdictions require suspects to formally request counsel before they are appointed an attorney. The Court explained that suspects are afforded sufficient Fifth and
Sixth Amendment protections. Accordingly, the appropriate analysis is not whether or not the suspect was appointed counsel, but whether or not officers provided
the suspect with his Miranda warnings and whether the
suspect invoked those rights.
Although the Court found that the Louisiana
Supreme Court correctly rejected Montejo’s claim under
Jackson, the Court remanded the lower court’s decision
in order to provide Montejo an opportunity to contend
that his letter of apology should still have been suppressed on other grounds.
Justices Alito, joined by Justice Kennedy, filed
a concurring opinion, noting that the Court was entitled
to reject the doctrine of stare decisis and overturn Jackson because Jackson was poorly reasoned.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer dissented, arguing that
Jackson was not poorly reasoned and did not need to be
overturned.
Justice Breyer filed a separate dissenting opinion, taking exception to the dissent’s concession that
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) should have
been overturned.

the owner consented to entry by previously permitting
an undercover informant into the home?
Should the Court should overrule Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), a case holding that a qualified immunity challenge must pass a two-pronged test:
first, the facts alleged must show that the government
official(s) violated a constitutional right, and second that
constitutional right was clearly established?
Facts:
An informant for the Central Utah Narcotics
Task Force arranged to buy methamphetamine from
Afton Callahan. The informant arrived at respondent’s
residence, confirmed Callahan had methamphetamine,
and then left Callahan’s home to obtain money. Police
officers gave the informant a marked $100 bill and a
concealed electronic transmitter on the informant’s person. Callahan’s daughter let the informant into the home
while Callahan retrieved a large bag containing methamphetamine from his freezer and sold the informant a
gram of methamphetamine. Then the informant gave
an “arrest” signal, and law enforcement entered the
home through a porch door. The officers conducted a
protective sweep of the premises, recovering the large
bag of methamphetamine, the marked bill, the small bag
containing methamphetamine from the informant, and
drug syringes. Callahan was charged with the unlawful
possession and distribution of methamphetamine.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Callahan sued the police officers for conducting a warrantless search. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
held the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity,
finding that a reasonable police officer would have
known not to proceed into the home without a search
warrant.

decision:
Justice Alito delivered the Court’s unanimous
opinion
holding the Saucier protocol should not be rePearson v. Callahan
garded as mandatory in all cases and concluded the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The Court
revisited the doctrine of qualified immunity protecting
555 U.S. ___ (2009)
government officials “from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly estabdecided: January 2009
lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,” as declared in
questions Presented:
For qualified immunity purposes, may police of- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) and
ficers enter a home without a warrant on the theory that Saucier, 533 U.S. 194. Under Saucier the Supreme
Court mandated a two-step procedure for resolving
Criminal Law Brief
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whether government officials’ qualify for immunity.
The procedure requires courts to first decide whether the
plaintiff has alleged facts that constitute a violation of a
constitutional right. If the first step is satisfied, then the
court must decide whether the right at issue was “clearly
established” at the time of government official’s alleged
misconduct.
Reviewing the consequences of Saucier, the
Court determined that the imposition of the Saucier rule
requires courts to depart from the general rule of constitutional avoidance, creates unnecessary litigation of
constitutional issues, wastes the parties’ and judicial resources when such litigation has no effect on the outcome of the case, and fails to contribute to the
development of constitutional law because of the factintensive nature of the cases. Upon this reflection the
Court held that, although the Saucier procedure is often
appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory. The Court concluded that district court and appellate court judges should be permitted to exercise
discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the
qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first.
Applying this rational, the Court concluded that because
these officers relied on the “consent-once-removed”
doctrine, which had gained acceptance in the lower
courts, the officers did not violate clearly established
law and are entitled to qualified immunity.

Rivera v. Illinois

(1986), parties are constitutionally prohibited from exercising peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based
on race, ethnicity, or sex. At trial, the challenged juror
was appointed the jury foreperson and the jury found
Rivera guilty of first-degree murder.
On appeal, Rivera challenged the trial court’s rejection of his peremptory challenge. The Supreme
Court of Illinois held that the peremptory challenge
should have been allowed, but that the error was harmless.
decision:
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the
lower decision, holding that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment does not require reversal
whenever a criminal defendant’s peremptory challenge
is erroneously denied. The Court emphasized that it has
never held a freestanding constitutional right to peremptory challenges, referring to it as a “creature of statute.”
Rejecting Rivera’s argument, the Court held that if a defendant is tried before a qualified jury composed of individuals not challengeable for cause, then the loss of a
peremptory challenge due to a state court’s good-faith
error is not a matter of federal constitutional concern.
The Court concluded the trial judge’s refusal to excuse
the challenged juror did not deprive Rivera of his constitutional right to a fair trial. The record did not show
that the trial judge repeatedly or deliberately misapplied
the law or acted in an arbitrary or irrational manner. Instead, the record demonstrated the trial judge’s effort to
enforce the anti-discrimination requirements of Batson.

556 U.S. ___ (2009)
decided: March 2009

Vermont v. Brillon

556 U.S. ___ (2009)
question Presented:
Does an erroneous denial of a criminal defendant’s peremptory challenge, resulting in the challenged decided: March 2009
juror being seated, require automatic reversal of a conquestion Presented:
viction?
Do delays caused by public defenders, or resultFacts:
ing from a state’s system of public defense, deprive a
During jury selection in Michael Rivera’s first- criminal defendant of his right to a speedy trial?
degree murder trial, his counsel sought to use a peremptory challenge to strike a female venire member. Facts:
However, Rivera had already exercised two peremptory
On July 27, 2001, police arrested Michael Brilchallenges against women, one of whom was African- lon for assaulting his girlfriend. Three days later he was
American. Believing Rivera was discriminating against arraigned in a vermont state court and charged with
women, the trial court rejected the third peremptory felony domestic assault. The day of the arraignment,
challenge. Under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 the county public defender’s office appointed a public
118

Winter 2009

defender as Brillon’s first attorney. In October, the public defender filed a motion to recuse the trial judge.
After a month, the motion was denied. In mid-January,
the public defender moved for a continuance and the
trial court denied the motion. On February 22, four days
before the jury draw, the public defender again moved
for a continuance. When the trial court denied the motion, Brillon asked the public defender be dismissed as
his counsel and the court granted the motion. That same
day, the trial court appointed a second attorney, but the
second attorney immediately withdrew based on a conflict. On March 1, 2002, the court assigned Brillon a
third attorney. On May 20, Brillon filed a motion to dismiss the third attorney for failure to file motions and
lack of communication. On June 11, the third attorney
moved to withdraw himself on the ground that Brillon
had threatened his life. That same day, the trial court
appointed a fourth attorney. Two months later, Brillon
filed a motion to dismiss the fourth attorney. At a November 26 hearing, the fourth attorney reported that his
contract with the Defender General’s office had expired
several months prior and that he was attempting to have
Brillon’s case reassigned. On January 15, 2003 the defender’s office appointed Brillon’s fifth attorney. The
fifth attorney sought an extension for discovery deadlines on February 25. However, on April 10, the fifth
attorney withdrew from the case based on contract modifications with the Defender General. On August 1,
2003, the Defender’s Office appointed a sixth attorney
for Brillon. On February 23, 2004, Brillon filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, but the trial
court denied the motion.
The case finally went to trial on June 14, 2004.
The jury found Brillon guilty and he was sentenced to
12 to 20 years in prison. The vermont Supreme Court
vacated defendant’s conviction and held that he had
been denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
decision:
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded the vermont Supreme Court’s decision,
holding that the vermont Supreme Court erred in considering Brillon’s assigned counsel as state actors because assigned counsel, just as retained counsel, act on
behalf of their clients, and delays sought by counsel are
ordinarily attributable to the defendants they represent.
Noting that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a speedy
trial is dependent upon circumstances, the Court attributed most of the delays to the defendant’s dismissal of
counsel. Referring to Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
Criminal Law Brief

(1972), which established a balancing test in which the
conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are
weighed, the Court highlighted several factors in determining whether a delay constitutes a deprivation of a
speedy trial: length of delay, reason for the delay, the
defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and
prejudice to the defendant. The Court found that most
of the delays in Brillon’s trial were attributable to him.
Accordingly, the Court concluded, absent defendant’s
deliberate efforts to force the withdrawal of his prior
counsel, no speedy-trial issue would have arisen.
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that there was no convincing reason to
find error in the vermont Supreme Court decision. In
overturning Brillon’s conviction, the vermont Supreme
Court, the dissent argued, properly attributed time
against the state.

Wong v. Belmontes
558 U.S. ___ (2009)
decided: November 2009
question Presented:
Is an individual deprived of effective assistance
of counsel where counsel failed to present mitigating
evidence regarding that individual’s background, character, mental state, and positive prison adjustment?
Facts:
While committing a burglary, Fernando Belmontes clubbed Steacy McConnell to death with a steel
dumbbell bar. Belmontes struck her 15-20 times in the
head until she died and then he stole her stereo. A jury
convicted Belmontes of murder and he was sentenced
to death.
At the sentencing hearing, Belmontes’s defense
attorney elicited testimony from nine witnesses about
Blemontes’s difficult childhood and religious conversion. As a strategy decision, Belmontes’s attorney refused to elicit any other character evidence because the
attorney did not want to open the door for the prosecution to discuss a prior murder in which Belmontes was
found, after the fact, to be an accessory.
Belmontes argued that, because his counsel did
not investigate and present sufficient mitigating evidence, he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel. The court of appeals agreed and granted Belmontes
119

federal habeas relief.
decision:
The Supreme Court held that Belmontes was not
deprived of effective assistance of counsel. Upholding
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the
Court concluded that, to show ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must establish that defense counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and prejudice. The Court found that
Belmontes’s attorney understood the gravity of Belmontes’s conduct in the prior murder and formed his
strategy to prevent “opening of the door.” The Court
weighed how a jury would react to all the mitigating evidence in light of the aggravating evidence. The Court
concluded that Belmontes’s attorney submitted sufficient mitigating character evidence.

Yeager v. United States
557 U.S. ___ (2009)
decision: June 2009
question Presented:
Under the Double Jeopardy Clause, may the
government retry acquitted defendants on factually related counts when the jury failed to reach a verdict?
Facts:
Scott Yeager, a former Enron executive, was
charged with wire fraud, securities fraud, insider trading,
money laundering, and conspiracy to engage in securities fraud and wire fraud. At trial the government tried
to show that Yeager defrauded Enron investors and
shareholders by purposely making misrepresentations
and material omissions about revenues, business performance, and technological capabilities. The jury acquitted Yeager on several securities and wire fraud
counts, but deadlocked on the remaining counts. The
government subsequently recharged Yeager for insider
trading and money laundering offenses.
Yeager moved to dismiss on double jeopardy
grounds. This district court denied the motion and the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

jury’s failure to return a verdict on other factually related
counts does not diminish the acquittals’ potential issuepreclusive force under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Relying on Ashe v. Swenson 397 U.S. 436 (1970), which
precludes the government from retrying any crimes that
have as a necessary element any issue that was already
decided in a prior acquittal, the Court explained that, in
identifying which issues a jury had previously conclusively determined, courts should look only to the jury’s
decisions rather than its failures to decide. In other
words, “a jury speaks only through its verdict” because
hung counts are unavoidably inscrutable. The Court
concluded the jury’s inability to reach a verdict on the
insider trading counts were a “nonevent,” entitled to no
weight. The Court concluded that if the acquittal of insider trading was a critical issue of ultimate fact of all
the other charges, then the prosecution would be barred
from recharging on the other counts.
Justice Kennedy filed a separate concurring
opinion, expressing that the Court should have required
the lower court to revisit the factual analysis, rather than
making it optional.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and
Justice Alito dissented, arguing that the Double Jeopardy clause can have no preclusive effect within the
same proceeding. There must be a separate prosecution
altogether.
Justice Alito authored another separate dissent, to which
Justices Thomas and Scalia joined, arguing that an acquittal should only have preclusive effect when it would
have been irrational for the jury to acquit without a finding of fact.

grAnted CertiorAri
Florida v. Powell
08-1175
Argued: December 2009
question Presented:
Does the lack of any explicit advice stating that
a suspect has the right to counsel during questioning violate Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)?

decision:
In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that an apparent Facts:
inconsistency between acquittals on some counts and a
120
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Kevin Powell was convicted of felony in possession of a firearm. When Powell was arrested and taken
to the police department for questioning, the police recited to Powell, “You have the right to remain silent. If
you give up this right to remain silent, anything you say
can be used against you in court. You have the right to
talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions.
If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed for you without cost and before any questioning.
You have the right to use any of these rights at any time
you want during this interview.” Powell subsequently
waived his rights. Powell appealed his conviction arguing that he was not did not explicitly notified that he had
a right to an attorney “during” his questioning, and
therefore the questioning violated Miranda. The Florida
Supreme Court ultimately reversed the conviction, holding that being told that an individual has the right to talk
an attorney before questioning is insufficient.

Johnson v. United States
08-6925
Argued: October 2009
question Presented:
Is a prior state conviction for “battery,” in all
cases, considered a “violent felony,” even where the
state does not include as an element of the offense the
use or threatened use of physical force?
Facts:

Curtis Johnson pleaded guilty to a single federal
charge of possession of ammunition as a convicted
felon. Johnson had several previous felony state convictions for aggravated battery, burglary, and battery.
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes a 15Graham v. Florida & Sullivan v. Florida
year mandatory minimum sentence for an individual
convicted under the act who also has three prior convic08-7412 & 08-7621
tions for “violent felonies.” Under ACCA, Johnson was
subject to a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence. The
Argued: November 2009
district court sentenced him to 185 months of imprisonment. On appeal the Florida Supreme Court overturned
question Presented:
Does the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and the sentence, ruling that battery did not constitute a viunusual punishment prohibit the sentence of life without olent felony because the use of force was not an element
the possibility of parole imposed on a juvenile convicted of the crime. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, upholding
of a non-homicide offense?
the trial court sentence.
Facts:
Terrance Graham was convicted of armed burglary and attempted armed robbery at the age of 16.
After serving a 12-month sentence, Graham was accused of a probation violation for his involvement in an
armed burglary. At the probation violation hearing, the
judge considered Graham’s violent history and sentenced him to life in prison without parole.
At the age of thirteen, Joseph Sullivan was convicted of burglary and raping an elderly woman. At sentencing, the state presented evidence that Sullivan had
participated in at least seventeen crimes before the rape
and burglary. The judge determined that, given Sullivan’s violent past, he should be treated as an adult offender and sentenced Sullivan to life in prison without
the chance of parole.

Maryland v. Shatzer
08-680
Argued: October 2009
question Presented:
Is Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981),
which prohibits interrogation of a suspect who has invoked the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, still applicable when the interrogation continues after a
substantial delay from when the suspect requested counsel?
Facts:
In 2006, Michael Shatzer, Sr., was charged with
a sexual offense in the second degree, sexual child abuse
by a parent, second degree assault, and contributing to
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conditions rendering a child in need of assistance. In
August 2003, a police officer received a referral from a
social worker about a child sexual abuse case. After interviewing the child, the police officer contacted Shatzer
in jail where he was being held on a sex-offense charge
involving a different victim. At the outset of the interrogation, the police officer notified Shatzer he was an
officer and read him his Miranda rights. Shatzer invoked his right to counsel and the interview ceased. In
March of 2006, a different police officer, investigating
the same case, visited Shatzer in jail and read Shatzer
his Miranda rights. Shatzer signed the form and agreed
to talk with the officer. During this interrogation,
Schatzer never invoked his right to an attorney.
At trial, Schatzer moved to suppress the confession, arguing that he had invoked his right to counsel three
years prior to the 2006 interrogation. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Edwards applies when a
suspect has been continually incarcerated and previously
invoked his right to counsel.

Pottawattamie County v. McGhee
08-1065
Argued: November 2009
question Presented:
Can a prosecutor, who procured false testimony
during an investigation and then introduced the testimony against a defendant at trial, be subjected to a civil
trial and potential damages for a wrongful conviction
and incarceration?
Facts:

In 1978, Curtis McGhee Jr. was tried and convicted for the murder of an Iowa police officer. The
Iowa Supreme Court vacated Harrington’s conviction in
2003, after becoming aware that the prosecutors failed
to disclose exculpatory evidence of an alternative suspect. In 2005, McGhee sued the prosecutors under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the prosecutors had coerced
false testimony from witnesses and intentionally withPadilla v. Kentucky
held exculpatory evidence of an alternative suspect.
The trial court granted Pottawattamie County’s
motion for summary judgment based on absolute and
08-651
qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit held that a
prosecutor’s procurement of false testimony, without
question Presented:
Does the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effec- more, does not violate any of a criminal defendant’s
tive assistance of counsel require an attorney to advise constitutional rights. McGhee appealed to the Eighth
a non-citizen client that a guilty plea will trigger manda- Circuit under the collateral order doctrine. The Eighth
tory deportation, and if so, does it warrant setting aside Circuit reversed, holding that a prosecutor has no immunity “where the prosecutor was accused of both fabthe guilty plea?
ricating evidence and then using the fabricated evidence
at trial,” resulting in a post-trial “deprivation of liberty.”
Facts:
Jose Padilla, a non-citizen, was charged with
trafficking and possessing marijuana, possession of drug
Smith v. Spisak
paraphernalia, and operating a tractor without a weight
and distance tax number. Relying on advice from his
attorney, Padilla pleaded guilty to the drug charges. 08-724
Padilla’s guilty plea and subsequent conviction triggered
Argued: October 2009
deportation proceedings. Padilla filed for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed and remanded question Presented:
Did the Sixth Circuit contravene the Antiterrorthe conviction. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed,
ism
and
Effective Death Penalty Act by improperly exholding that collateral consequences of attorneys’ advice
tending Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), which
are outside the scope of the Sixth Amendment.
held that, in capital cases, jurors may not be precluded
from considering any mitigating circumstances proffered by the defendant?
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Argued: November 2009

Facts:
Frank Spisak was convicted of three murders in
1983. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court instructed the jury that if they all found proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances in
each separate count outweighed the mitigating factors,
then they must return that finding to the court. Spisak
was subsequently sentenced to death.
However, the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the conviction, finding ineffective assistance of
counsel and a Mills violation because the jury instructions required unanimity in the finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court vacated the
judgment and remanded the case in light of Carey v.
Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006) and Schriro v. Landrigan,
550 U.S. 465 (2007), two cases which addressed
Spisak’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. On remand, the Sixth Circuit reinstated its decision.

United States v. Stevens
08-769
Argued: October 2009
question Presented:
Is 18 U.S.C. § 48, criminalizing, inter alia,
“knowingly selling depictions of animal cruelty with the
intention of placing those depictions in interstate commerce for commercial gain” facially invalid under the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?
Facts:
Robert Stevens was convicted of selling videos
of pit bulls participating in dog fights and attacking
other animals through his business, “Dogs of velvet and
Steel” and a website called Pitbulllife.com. Stevens
moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the
federal statute violates the Free Speech Clause, but the
district court denied the motion. On appeal, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, finding that the statute was facially unconstitutional as a
content-based prohibition of speech.

question Presented:
Did the state court err in its application of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act when the
state court determined that it was not ineffective assis
tance of counsel for a defendant’s novice attorney failure
to present available evidence of the defendant’s severely
impaired mental functioning?
Facts:
In 1994, Mr. Holly Wood was convicted capital
murder for killing his former girlfriend in her home. Evidence showed that Wood had an IQ within the range of
mental retardation. At sentencing, Wood’s attorney, who
had just recently been admitted to the bar, only attempted to mitigate by eliciting pleas of mercy from
Wood’s family members, testimony about his upbringing, a police report that indicated he had been drinking
at the time of his arrest, and a parole board report remarking that Wood needed anger-management therapy.
The novice attorney made no attempt to introduce evidence of mental retardation, and had not attempted to
investigate Wood’s mental handicaps. The jury sentenced Wood death.
Both the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the conviction
and sentence, finding that the attorney’s decision not to
introduce evidence of mental retardation was a strategic
decision. Wood subsequently filed for relief in federal
courts. The federal district court granted relief, concluding that it was an unreasonable determination that the
attorney’s failure to introduce evidence was a strategic
decision. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, concluding
that there was ample evidence for the state courts to determine that the decision was a strategic move.
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